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THE ROTATION MODEL AFTER THE LAUNCH OF THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE SECTOR TRANSFORMATION:

WHAT HAS CHANGED AND WHAT TO DO NEXT



The essence of the mobilisation reform, the evolution of motivations in 2023–2026, survey data, and the steps without which the situation in the security and defence sector cannot be changed

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Hanns Seidel Stiftung

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Key points

THE REFORM BEGAN IN LINE WITH THE LOGIC OF THE ROTATION MODEL, BUT WITHOUT A LAW, PARITY AND A QUEUE IT REMAINS A PRIVILEGE FOR CONTRACT SOLDIERS. FROM HERE ON, EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON TRUST

86%

THE PROBLEM IS IN THE DESIGN, NOT IN PEOPLE

Almost nine in ten respondents see serious problems with mobilisation (2025: 91%). Open-ended service makes evasion rational: ideological motives sit at the bottom of the ranking

r = S/(S+R)

THE ROTATION MODEL IN THREE RULES

A defined term of service, a guaranteed window of civilian life, a visible queue and equal rules for mobilised and contract soldiers. A share of time in service r ⩽ 0.33–0.40 makes voluntary service rational



THE STATE'S FIRST STEP: RESOLUTION NO. 768

Contract terms, post-service deferment, risk-based pay and a yearly transfer draw on the model's logic. Not done: a law, parity for the mobilised, a queue, demobilisation. It is an offer to attract new people into infantry and assault units, rather than a comprehensive reform.

6,21 → 6,57

MOTIVATIONS HAVE EVOLVED

From fear and chaos (2023–2024) to demands for terms and fairness (2025) and to the demand to prove what was promised (2026): uncertainty about the length of service has sharpened, and "distrust that the state will keep its promises" immediately became the second factor among civilians

85%

TRUST HAS BECOME THE MAIN CURRENCY

85% do not believe that the discharge of those serving since 2014 and 2022 will begin in November; 74% do not believe in post-contract deferment; trust fell for 52% after the government's resignation (42%: "the reform was put on hold"). At the same time, registered civilians opened up: a categorical "no" fell from 39% to 8%

4 STEPS

WHAT TO DO, AND IN WHAT ORDER

A decree and the first real discharges in November 2026 → a law on terms of service, rotation and demobilisation → a public queue → parity for everyone who serves. Plus recruitment without "busification" and a state information policy. The test for every step: does it strengthen the Democracy of National Resilience

Data: Foundation for Democracy Assistance / InfoLight.UA, online surveys.

I

WHY MOBILISATION BECAME A CRISIS OF TRUST



The diagnosis has not changed: the problem lies in the design of open-ended service, not in people's motivation.
Data from five waves of research in 2023–2026 show the same vicious circle.

The vicious circle of the mobilization crisis

INJUSTICE BREEDS EVASION, EVASION BREEDS COERCION, COERCION DESTROYS TRUST, AND DISTRUST DEEPENS INJUSTICE AGAIN

INJUSTICE

service is open-ended, the rules are opaque, the burden falls on those without the resources for exemptions (buying one's way out and other corrupt solutions)

EVASION

a rational response to an uncertain and unequal burden: people wait rather than come forward

COERCION

the more people evade, the harsher the method of coercion becomes: "busification", raids, conflicts

DISTRUST

defence is perceived as something "done to you"; those with resources look for exemptions

the circle closes: distrust breeds injustice again

- The root of the problem is neither "bad citizens" nor a "bad state", but a structure that made the burden of service open-ended and unequal
- More coercion does not break the circle, because coercion is one of its elements; moral appeals shatter against the sense of injustice
- The way out is structural: change the design of the burden so that participation becomes predictable, fair and compatible with dignity

THE DIAGNOSIS IN NUMBERS

- 86% of 2026 respondents see serious problems with mobilisation (2025: 91%); both the military (83%) and civilians (90%)
- About 70% of Ukrainians rate the work of the TCCs (territorial recruitment centres) negatively; 63% name coercion and rights violations as the main source of conflicts (Slovo i Dilo, August 2026)
- 77% of 2025 respondents personally knew people mobilised by force; in 2026, 18% have "many such acquaintances" and 55% "a few"
- Attacks, physical violence and even killings of TCC servicemen in Lviv and other cities: the "military–civilian" conflict is becoming a security problem

The divide, measured

MOBILISATION HAS BECOME THE COUNTRY'S SECOND DIVIDING LINE, AND IT RUNS NOT BETWEEN "PATRIOTS" AND "DRAFT DODGERS" BUT BETWEEN THOSE WHO CARRY THE BURDEN AND THOSE WHO SEE NO RULES

56,4%

THE SECOND DIVIDING LINE

attitudes to mobilisation as a line of social division ("Power of Unity", April 2025, N = 225)

65%

TENSION IN ONE'S CIRCLE

feel tension over mobilisation in their own circle

42% → 43%

LOST RELATIVES

the share of those who lost relatives or loved ones after February 24, 2022 did not change between the 2025 and 2026 waves

36% → 18%

COERCION IN ONE'S CIRCLE

"many acquaintances mobilised by force": 2025 → 2026. Coercion has not disappeared, but it is perceived as less pervasive: "a few" rose from 41% to 55%

22%

"NO ONE, THE SYSTEM DOES NOT CHANGE"

a new 2026 answer to the question "who can change the situation": 19% among the military, 24% among civilians

20%

"I TRUST NO ONE"

on mobilisation matters, 2026; 31% among the military. Friends and relatives who serve are the main channel of trust (49%)



Internal divisions are not a side effect of the war but a separate theatre of operations: the enemy wins not only at the front, but through the internal exhaustion of society

PEOPLE DO NOT REFUSE TO SERVE BECAUSE THEY DO NOT WANT TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY: IN 2025 INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS SCORED 5–6 OUT OF 7, IDEOLOGICAL ONES 2.5–3.5



WHAT THE DATA SHOW

- Mean scores 1–7, civilians 2025. Even in the group that answered "no" to readiness to join: "I am waiting for a ceasefire" 4.62, "I do not want to fight for an illegitimate government" 4.57, "I do not understand the aim of the war" 4.30, "no chance of winning" 4.24, "I do not care" 3.27
- The rotation model changes the arithmetic: a volunteer serves a share r = S/(S+R); once the inevitability of mobilisation through coercion p exceeds r, voluntary service becomes the dominant strategy
- So it is the rules that need fixing, not "consciousness": this is the main argument for a rational contract with the state rather than relying solely on coercion or persuasion

Data: FDA survey 2025, factors for not joining: the "Possibly, under certain conditions" group (mean scores).

II

THE REFORM AND THE ROTATION MODEL

What the model proposes, what of it entered Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 768 of June 12, 2026, and why the first stage has not yet become a system

The rotation model in three formulas

THE STATE PROVIDES PREDICTABILITY, THE CITIZEN PROVIDES PARTICIPATION: A TERM, A GUARANTEED WINDOW OF CIVILIAN LIFE AND A QUEUE INSTEAD OF COERCION ON THE STREET

$$r = S / (S + R)$$

SHARE OF TIME IN SERVICE

S: term of service;
R: guaranteed window of civilian life with exemption from mobilisation and job retention.

$$p > r$$

INEVITABILITY HIGHER THAN THE SHARE OF TIME IN SERVICE

Voluntary service becomes rational when the probability of lawful coercion p (orderly registration, a visible queue, courts, police search) exceeds r. Inevitability must be legal, not street-based: otherwise the circle of coercion is not broken

$$A = C + r \cdot N$$

PLANNING THE FORCE

The required force on the line A consists of a professional contract core C (200,000–300,000) and a rotation corps N. With A = 600,000, C = 200,000 and r = 0.33, about 1.2 million are needed in the rotation corps; roughly four times as many must be on the register



LAW
a primary norm, not an experimental resolution



PARITY
equal rules for mobilised and contract soldiers



QUEUE
a visible discharge date in the app, public criteria



THE "1 → K" RULE
a long contract in a non-critical specialty only in exchange for k entries in the rotation queue

Data: NGO "Foundation for Democracy Assistance" / InfoLight.UA, online survey

A service cycle instead of open-ended service

FOUR STAGES A PERSON KNOWS IN ADVANCE: TRAINING, SERVICE, A GUARANTEED WINDOW OF CIVILIAN LIFE AND RETURN THROUGH A TRANSPARENT QUEUE

01

TRAINING AND COHESION

At least 2–3 months of basic training and unit cohesion before the front, part of the time in the brigade; the right to choose at recruitment

02

SERVICE FOR A DEFINED TERM

S = 8–14 months depending on the specialty (Resolution No. 768: 10/14 months for infantry-assault contracts, 24 for combat and basic ones)

03

WINDOW OF CIVILIAN LIFE

R = 6–24 months with full exemption from mobilisation and job retention; recovery, work, family, skills upkeep in the reserve

04

RETURN THROUGH THE QUEUE

A new call-up through transparent registration and a visible queue, mostly to the same unit, where cohesion and shared service experience already exist

FOR WHOM

For everyone who serves, through the queue: mobilised soldiers without a contract cannot be a "second group". The professional core stays on 1–5-year contracts for critical specialties



WHAT THE STATE GUARANTEES

A return date, a job, a standard of rest and a yearly transfer, judicial protection and compensation for violated terms, a public performance dashboard



WHAT THE CITIZEN GIVES

Participation and lawful registration. "Serve or Contribute": those who cannot serve make a contribution defined by law: reserve service without leaving one's job, training, defence work



What changed in June 2026

JUNE 2026: NEW MOTIVATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH DEFINED TERMS AND DEFERMENT WERE INTRODUCED; HIGHER PAY WAS EXTENDED TO MOBILISED SOLDIERS AS WELL

NEW CONTRACTS (FROM JUNE 15, 2026)

- Infantry-assault: 10 months for serving soldiers, 14 for new recruits, from 6 for those discharged after service during the special period with the relevant training. Applies to defined positions and units.
- Combat: standard term of 24 months. For combat positions outside the infantry-assault list.
- Basic: standard term of 24 months. Mainly for rear and support positions.
- An experimental project until June 2028. Draft law No. 14283 was withdrawn on July 16, 2026.

DEFERMENT AND SOLDIERS' RIGHTS

- After discharge from a motivational contract on the stipulated grounds: a basic deferment of 6 months.
- Additional deferment depends on the type of contract, confirmed combat days and previous service. Different formulas apply to infantry-assault and 24-month contracts.
- Transfer via Army+ under the established conditions.
- Simplified return from AWOL until 20 September 2026 inclusive for cases recorded up to and including June 12, 2026.

PAY (FROM JUNE 1, 2026)

- The new payments are also available to mobilised soldiers and soldiers on old contracts, subject to the relevant conditions.
- Rear positions without combat bonuses: an additional UAH 10,000; minimum pay from UAH 30,000 per month.
- For defined tasks: UAH 50,000 at command posts; UAH 70,000 up to a company strongpoint; UAH 170,000 up to a platoon strongpoint. For direct participation in combat: up to UAH 100,000.
- Assault daily payments of UAH 20,000 or UAH 40,000. The cap on defined combat payments is UAH 460,000 per month; certain bonuses are paid on top.
- According to the Ministry of Defence, an audit and optimisation freed up about UAH 60 billion for the first stage of the reform.

THE KEY PROMISE

In June, the start of a partial discharge of soldiers serving since 2022 or earlier was announced for late autumn 2026. The proposed criteria are length of service and the number of combat days; the order will be determined by the General Staff. The announcement depends on the situation at the front.
A corresponding presidential decree may allow discharge before the end of a new contract. As of September 13, 2026 it has not been adopted.

WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED

For mobilised soldiers without a new contract, no general fixed term of service has been set; other legal grounds for discharge remain. The launch of "Reserve+ offices" has not been confirmed. Digital registration is being introduced, but a public discharge queue has not been confirmed. Notification groups continue to operate in public places.

The model versus the reform

WHAT OF THE ROTATION MODEL ENTERED RESOLUTION NO. 768, AND WHAT WAS LEFT OUTSIDE IT


Parameter	Research model (2024–2025)	Resolution No. 768 (June 2026)	Status
Term of service	corridor S = 8–14 months	infantry 6 / 10 / 14 months, combat and basic 24 months	✓ within the corridor for infantry
Recovery period	R = 12–24 months guaranteed	deferment from 6 months plus a formula for combat days and length of service	⏳ partly
Share of time in service r	r ⩽ 0.33–0.40	≈ 0.32 for 10 months with 5 in combat; up to 0.62–0.70 without combat days	⏳ only for "combat" units
Inevitability p > r	lawful registration, a visible queue, courts	registration not put in order, street mobilisation continues	✗not done
Parity	equal rules for mobilised and contract soldiers	guarantees only for those who signed a contract	✗a two-speed army
Legal form	a law, not secondary legislation	a Cabinet resolution, an experiment until June 2028; draft law No. 14283 withdrawn	✗not done
Demobilisation as an element of trust	a mandatory component	announced by presidential decree from November 2026; no decree yet	⏳ the November test



The reform took a first step in the logic of the rotation model, but without a law, parity and orderly registration (p > r) the cycle remains incomplete: the rational strategy of a civilian has not changed

The main asymmetry of the first stage

A TWO-SPEED ARMY: GUARANTEES ONLY FOR CONTRACT SOLDIERS ARE REJECTED BY BOTH THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS; 82% DEMAND THAT TERMS AND DEFERMENT BE EXTENDED TO EVERYONE WHO SERVES



WHAT THIS MEANS

- "First to those who have served longest, then to all" 57%; "equal guarantees for all at once" 25%; "guarantees only for contract soldiers as an incentive" was chosen by just 2%
- 66% are against the reform element "guarantees only for those who signed a contract"; 69% among the military
- 85% do not believe that the discharge of those serving since 2014/2022 will begin in November; 89% among those serving over 4 years
- Among the military, 29% are not signing a new contract precisely because they are waiting for the decree; 47% among those serving over 4 years. Contracts do not compete with demobilisation

2026 survey data (all respondents, military, civilians).

III

HOW MOTIVATIONS EVOLVED, 2023–2026



From fear and chaos to demands for terms and fairness, and then to the demand to prove what was promised.
Five waves of research show how society's demands on the state have changed.

Three stages of one demand

THE COMMON DENOMINATOR OF ALL WAVES: PEOPLE ARE READY TO TAKE RISKS IF THE RULES ARE EQUAL AND HAVE A KNOWN DURATION. WHAT CHANGES IS ONLY WHAT THEY DEMAND FROM THE STATE FIRST

2023–2024 · FEAR AND CHAOS

- The first wave (November–December 2023) and the study "Mobilisation: Barriers and Ways to Solutions"
- Main themes: risk of death, incompetent command, corruption in the TCCs, lack of training and supplies
- "No possibility to transfer between units" was only No. 13 in the 2024 ranking of obstacles
- The demand: training, supplies, basic fairness; the rotation model was first presented to stakeholders in July 2024

2025 · TERMS AND FAIRNESS

- The second wave (October–December 2025)
- Barriers: uncertainty about the length of service 6.21 (82% of scores 6–7), unfair mobilisation 6.13, corruption in TCCs / medical boards 5.85, no rotations 5.84; transfers rose to No. 8
- Three steps for the state: pay 44%, a fixed 12-month term 44%, rotations 33%
- 69% believe rotation would reduce tension; 45% are ready for partial or rotational service

2026 · TRUST IN PROMISES


- The third wave after the launch of the reform (from September 7, 2026, fieldwork ongoing)
- Barriers sharpened: length of service 6.57 (91% of scores 6–7), rotations 6.17; the new factor "distrust that the state will keep its promises" 6.03 immediately came second among civilians
- Three steps: a law 54%, a discharge decree 52%, pay 29%
- What would raise trust: real discharge of those serving since 2022 (40%), a law instead of a resolution (37%), a public queue (23%)



In 2025 people named the conditions of service (term, money, choice of unit). In 2026 the same things became conditions of trust: incentives turned into preconditions

Obstacles to effective mobilisation, all respondents

AFTER THE REFORM, THE VERY BARRIERS IT WAS MEANT TO REMOVE SHARPENED: TERMS, ROTATIONS, FAIRNESS. COMPLAINTS ABOUT COMMAND AND TRAINING WEAKENED




WHAT THIS MEANS

- Uncertainty about the length of service: 6.21 → 6.57; scores of 6–7 given by 82% → 91%
- No regular rotations: 5.84 → 6.17; corruption in TCCs / medical boards: 5.85 → 6.00
- Fell: poor senior-level command 5.66 → 4.92, quality of recruits' training 5.32 → 4.63: the change of Commander-in-Chief and the command reform removed part of the criticism
- Among the military the shift is even sharper: length of service 6.42 → 6.64, rotations 5.85 → 6.36, street mobilisation 4.29 → 5.42. Reweighting to the 2025 composition confirms: this is an effect of attitudes, not of sample composition

Mean scores on a 1–7 scale (1: no influence at all, 7: very strong influence); 10 identically worded rows in the 2025 and 2026 questionnaires.

What holds people back personally: civilians

TERMS, FEAR OF DEATH AND DISTRUST ROSE; COMMAND, TRAINING AND CHOICE OF UNIT WEAKENED. "ARMY QUALITY" BARRIERS MOVED TO THE BACKGROUND, TRUST BARRIERS CAME TO THE FORE




WHAT THIS MEANS

- Uncertainty about the length of service: 5.82 → 6.07; fear of death or disability: 5.08 → 5.45
- Distrust of the command: 5.70 → 5.07; lack of training: 5.05 → 4.14; choice of unit: 5.01 → 4.07
- New rows in 2026: "distrust that the state will keep its promises" 6.03 (second place, right after terms), "political instability" 3.86, "I am waiting for a ceasefire" 2.93
- The "possibly, under certain conditions" group scored distrust in promises at 6.07 and corruption in TCCs / medical boards at 5.73: model v2 with a law and a queue is aimed at exactly this group

Mean scores on a 1–7 scale among civilian respondents in 2025 and 2026; 9 identically worded rows.

From incentives to conditions of trust

IN 2025 PEOPLE NAMED WHAT WOULD CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE TO SERVICE. IN 2026 THEY NAME WHAT WOULD MAKE THEM BELIEVE THE STATE'S PROMISES: FIRST DELIVER WHAT WAS PROMISED, THEN A LAW




WHAT THIS MEANS

- In 2025 the "triggers for going voluntary" were a fixed term, transparency and choice of unit: conditions of service
- In 2026 the top places went to "first, real discharge of those serving since 2022" (40%) and "a law, not a resolution" (37%): conditions of trust
- "Nothing, trust is lost" was chosen by 20%: 19% among the military, 21% among civilians
- A guaranteed job and family income (6%) is underrated as an instrument, although two thirds of respondents are married and almost two thirds have children

2025: the matrix "what could change your attitude to service", civilian respondents.
2026: the question "what would most raise trust in the state's promises", all respondents.

Readiness to join under certain conditions, civilians by status

A CATEGORICAL "NO" AMONG REGISTERED OR EXEMPT CIVILIANS FELL FROM 39% TO 8%; "POSSIBLY, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS" ROSE TO 62%. THIS IS THE GROUP WAITING FOR A LAW AND A QUEUE




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
- All civilians: "yes" 17% → 24%, "possibly, under conditions" 35% → 52%, "no" 43% → 21%
- Registered or exempt: "yes" 18% → 31%, "possibly" 40% → 62%, "no" 39% → 8% (a small group, read as a direction)
- Readiness is conditional in every wave: what turns that willingness into commitment is not the wording of the model but a demonstration that commitments are honoured

POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE 8/14 MODEL AMONG THE MILITARY FELL FROM 32% TO 9% AFTER THE LAUNCH OF THE "CONTRACT SOLDIERS ONLY" REFORM. BUT 35% WOULD BELIEVE IN MODEL V2 ONCE IT IS DEMONSTRATED ON THOSE ALREADY SERVING

THE 8/14 MODEL: THREE WAVES, AGGREGATED (%)



MODEL V2 WITH A LAW AND A QUEUE, 2026 (%, ALL MILITARY)



WHAT THIS MEANS

- Positive assessment of 8/14: 32% → 26% → 9%; negative 12% → 50%
- Model v2: "yes, once demonstrated on those already serving" 35%; "will retain those serving but won't bring civilians" 32%; "the problem is not the conditions" 15%
- The objection concerns the state's ability to deliver, not the model itself: demobilisation of the first cohorts is a precondition for any voluntary track

Military respondents of three waves: October 2025, December 2025 –January 2026, September 2026. Positive: "yes, many would go" and "yes, if fixed in law"; negative: "no effect", "people don't want to fight for this state", "the problem is not the conditions".


IV

THE 2025 AND 2026 SURVEYS: RESULTS AND DYNAMICS

Two waves, the same questions: 27 questions of the 2026 questionnaire repeat those of the 2025 questionnaire word for word.
We compare only identically worded questions and only by group: the samples are targeted, not random.

Are there problems with mobilisation

THE DIAGNOSIS HAS NOT CHANGED: ALMOST NINE IN TEN SEE SERIOUS PROBLEMS, BOTH THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS. THE REFORM CHANGED NOT THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM BUT ITS CONTENT



Share answering "yes, serious problems" among all respondents, the military and civilians in the 2025 and 2026 waves.


WHAT THIS MEANS

- Full distribution in 2026: serious problems 86%, some problems 11%, no problems 2%, hard to say 2%
- 2025: 91% / 8% / 0% / 1%
- In 2025 the problem was framed as "there are no rules". In 2026, after Resolution No. 768, as "the rules are not for everyone"


Awareness and assessment of the reform, 2026

THE REFORM IS ACCEPTED AS A DIRECTION AND REJECTED AS A DESIGN: 46% SEE "A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT INSUFFICIENT", ONLY 6% A REAL STEP TOWARDS FAIR RULES

AWARENESS OF THE REFORM (%)



ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORM (%)




WHAT THIS MEANS

- 55% know the details of the reform, 40% have heard about it in general terms, 5% learned about it from the survey
- "A real step towards fair rules": 0% among the military, 14% among civilians; "new injustices" 17%
- Among those who know the details, 22% name "new injustices"; among those who have only heard about it, 12%: the better people know the reform, the more sharply they see its asymmetry

2026 data: FDA / InfoLight.UA online survey, fieldwork ongoing.
2026 groups are small: read differences of up to 10 points asa direction, not a precise estimate.

Elements of the reform: what is accepted and what is rejected

CONSENSUS "FOR": A YEARLY TRANSFER, THE AWOL RETURN WINDOW, THE 14-MONTH TERM AND RISK-BASED PAY. CONSENSUS "AGAINST": GUARANTEES ONLY FOR CONTRACT SOLDIERS AND A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF A LAW



WHAT THIS MEANS


- The right to transfer once a year: 89% for, 5% against; the 100-day window to return from AWOL: 71% for, 14% against
- The 14-month term for civilians: 70% for, 18% against; risk-based pay: 68% for, 22% against; the 6-month deferment: 55% for, 31% against
- Guarantees only for those who signed a contract: 26% for, 66% against; reform by an experimental resolution: 20% for, 66% against
- The military are even harsher on the asymmetry: 69% against guarantees only for contract soldiers; civilians support the 14-month term no less than the military (76% versus 64%)

"For" = "support" + "rather support", "against" = "do not support" + "rather don't support".
2026 data: FDA / InfoLight.UA online survey, fieldwork ongoing.


Trust in the state's promises

74% DO NOT BELIEVE IN POST-CONTRACT DEFERMENT, 85% DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE DISCHARGE OF THOSE SERVING SINCE 2014 AND 2022 WILL BEGIN IN NOVEMBER. A DECREE IN NOVEMBER IS THE ONLY INSTRUMENT THAT CAN CHANGE THESE FIGURES

WILL THE STATE KEEP ITS PROMISE OF POST-CONTRACT DEFERMENT (%)



WILL THE DISCHARGE OF THOSE SERVING SINCE 2014/2022 BEGIN IN NOVEMBER 2026 (%)




WHAT THIS MEANS

- Post-contract deferment: do not believe at all 40%, rather don't believe 34%, believe 15%
- The November discharge: do not believe 85%; among those serving over 4 years, 89%; believe 3%
- After the resignation of the government and the defence minister, trust fell for 52%: "the reform was put on hold" 42%, "the reform lost its author" 11%; unchanged for 32%
- The reform appeared tied to one person. The lesson for the second stage: institutionalise it through a law and a public queue so that it does not depend on personalities


2026 data: FDA / InfoLight.UA online survey, fieldwork ongoing.

34% OF CIVILIANS WOULD CONSIDER SERVICE UNDER MODEL V2 WITH A LAW AND A QUEUE; AMONG REGISTERED OR EXEMPT CIVILIANS, 46%

IF MODEL V2 WERE ADOPTED AS A LAW (%, CIVILIANS BY STATUS)



WHAT RATIO OF SERVICE TO CIVILIAN LIFE IS FAIR (%)




WHAT THIS MEANS

- "Yes, I would consider it" 21% and "yes, after those serving since 2022 are discharged" 14% among all civilians; 31% and 15% among the registered or exempt
- "I don't believe the state would honour the law" 17%, "I would not go under any conditions" 17%, "I cannot serve" 28%
- The cycle: "the term does not matter, a guaranteed discharge date does" 46%; 12/24 months 23%; 12/18 months 12%; the current 14/6 contract cycle only 3%
- The conclusion for the law: emphasis on a guaranteed date and a queue rather than on the length of the window; the corridor S = 10–14 months and R = 6–24 months remains workable


2026 data: FDA / InfoLight.UA online survey, fieldwork ongoing.

THE DISCHARGE QUEUE SHOULD BE BASED ON COMBAT DAYS, LENGTH OF SERVICE AND WOUNDS: THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS HARDLY DIFFER HERE. ONLY 6% OF THE MILITARY HAVE SIGNED OR PLAN TO SIGN A NEW CONTRACT

TWO MAIN CRITERIA FOR THE DISCHARGE QUEUE (%)



WHAT THOSE SERVING DECIDED ABOUT A NEW CONTRACT (%)




WHAT THIS MEANS

- Combat days 40%, total length of service 37%, wounds and health 38%, 2022 volunteers first 29%; age, replacement and family are secondary
- Signed or plan to sign a contract 6%; no plans because they are waiting for the decree 29% (over 4 years of service: 47%); don't believe the terms will be honoured 38%
- Queue criteria can be fixed in law without risk of a split; contracts do not compete with demobilisation and, without a decree, do not work even as an incentive for those already in the ranks

2026 data: FDA / InfoLight.UA online survey, fieldwork ongoing.
2026 groups are small: read differences of up to 10 points a sa direction, not a precise estimate.

Will the rotation model together with the "serve or contribute" principle solve the problems

CIVILIANS BELIEVE MORE OFTEN (55% "YES" OR "PARTLY"); THE MILITARY DOUBT NOT THE MODEL BUT THE STATE'S ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT IT (33%)



WHAT THIS MEANS


- All: "yes, to a large extent" 20%, "partly" 23%, "the problem is deeper than service conditions" 26%, "the state is unable to implement it" 26%
- Among those for whom the reform is "a step in the right direction", 67% believe ("yes" and "partly"); among those who see "new injustices", 0%
- Among soldiers with under 4 years of service, "the state is unable to implement it" 47%; over 4 years 21%
- Belief in the model depends on the experience of dealing with the state, not on age or length of service. The military read "Serve or Contribute" as "buy your way out" unless the formula means an unavoidable contribution

The question asked respondents to set aside their political preferences. 2026 data: FDA / InfoLight.UA online survey, fieldwork ongoing.


Recruitment without "busification" and the measures the new team is discussing

52% WOULD TRUST CIVILIAN RECRUITMENT MODELS INSTEAD OF THE TCCS; FOREIGNERS IN THE INFANTRY, AMNESTY FOR A FIRST AWOL AND THE 50–55 AGE LIMIT HAVE CONSENSUS, PAID EXEMPTION AND EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR WOMEN ARE REJECTED

WHICH RECRUITMENT MODEL WOULD INSPIRE TRUST (%, ALL)



DO YOU SUPPORT THE MEASURES UNDER DISCUSSION (%)




WHAT THIS MEANS

- "Reserve+ offices" with the police 38%, civilian centres without coercion 14%, TCCs with body cameras 9%, transfer of the TCCs to the MoD 2%; "nothing will change while forced mobilisation exists" 28%
- Support: foreigners up to half of the infantry 88%, amnesty for a first AWOL 83%, the 50–55 age limit 72%, penalties for those evading registration 66%, mobilisation from 23 62%
- Paid exemption: 57% against (69% among the military); equal obligations for women: 49% against

2026 data: FDA / InfoLight.UA online survey, fieldwork ongoing.

Sources of information on mobilisation: registered or exempt civilians

NEWS MEDIA AS A SOURCE COLLAPSED FROM 47% TO 8%; PAGES OF COMBAT UNITS AND OFFICIAL PAGES OF STATE BODIES GREW. THE AUDIENCE IS ABANDONING INTERMEDIARIES IN FAVOUR OF PRIMARY SOURCES AND "THEIR OWN PEOPLE"




WHAT THIS MEANS

- Pages of combat units 39% → 54%; official pages of state bodies 34% → 54%; General Staff and MoD 29% → 38%
- Among all civilians who do not avoid the TCCs, news media fell from 46% to 19%; among the military, General Staff and MoD pages rose from 31% to 44%
- Telegram channels on call-up notices and lawyers' channels were named by no one in this group in 2026 (2025: 28% and 31%); in 2025 these were the No. 1 sources for those who evade (46% and 43%)
- For second-stage communication the key channels are not the media but unit pages, the official MoD and General Staff accounts and the networks of soldiers themselves

The 2026 group is small: the direction matches all civilians who do not avoid the TCCs. The question is identically worded in both waves.

Who can change the mobilisation situation

THE PERSONALISATION OF RESPONSIBILITY WEAKENED: "THE PRESIDENT" 77% → 63%, WHILE "NO ONE, THE SYSTEM DOES NOT CHANGE" IMMEDIATELY REACHED 22%. 48% EXPECT FAIRER RULES FROM THE NEW MOD AND GENERAL STAFF TEAM




WHAT THIS MEANS

- The President 77% → 63% (among the military 77% → 58%); the Verkhovna Rada, the MoD, the Commander-in-Chief and the Cabinet are stable: the reform lost its personal addressee but did not gain an institutional one
- Expectations of the new team (Khmara, Drapatyi, Skybiuk): fairer rules and more trust 48%, no substantial changes 40% (50% among the military), more coercion without guarantees 6%
- The war horizon: three years or more 38%, hard to say 40%, by spring 2027 11%: rotation is an instrument of a long war, not a temporary concession
- The window of opportunity for the new team is open, but it narrows with every month without a decree

Whom people trust and the one thing the state must do

FRIENDS AND RELATIVES WHO SERVE ARE THE MAIN CHANNEL OF TRUST (49%); ONE IN FIVE TRUSTS NO ONE. IN THE OPEN ANSWERS, 26% ASK FOR ONE THING: TO BEGIN THE REAL DISCHARGE OF THOSE SERVING SINCE 2014 AND 2022

WHICH SOURCES PEOPLE TRUST ON MOBILISATION MATTERS, 2026 (%, UP TO THREE ANSWERS)



OPEN QUESTION: "WHAT ONE THING MUST THE STATE DO FOR YOU TO BELIEVE ITS GUARANTEES ON TERMS OF SERVICE?"

26% discharge or demobilise those serving since 2014/2022; start demobilisation

15% keep promises and contracts, do not lie

15% equality: everyone serves, remove exemptions, MPs and officials too

11% a law and legality instead of a resolution

9% a transparent mechanism: a calculator, a points system, a visible queue

9% social protection, dignified treatment, support for families

9% there is no trust, nothing will help

Telling quotes: "Stop cheating the soldiers" · "Put the decree on terms into law" · "Show the mechanism through which these guarantees will work" · "Rotation must mean a maximum period on the front line followed by recovery in the rear"

V

RESEARCH BASE AND AUTHORS



Timeline

FOUR YEARS: FROM THE FIRST MONITORING IN MAY 2022 TO THE ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORM IN SEPTEMBER 2026

May 2022
InfoLight.UA begins monitoring Russian influence operations on mobilisation and refugees

March 2023
First proposals on putting mobilisation in order, for MPs and the security sector

Nov–Dec 2023
First survey wave on Ukrainians' attitudes to mobilisation

July 2024
First presentation of the rotation model to stakeholders

November 2024
"Mobilisation: Barriers and Ways to Solutions"

February 6, 2025
Presentation of the rotation model at Interfax-Ukraine

April 2025
"Power of Unity": resilience and cohesion

Oct–Dec 2025
Second wave on Ukrainians' attitudes to mobilisation

December 23, 2025
Presentation of the research at Ukrinform: results, the model, a package of five reforms, amendments to draft law No. 14283

Jan–June 2026
Working group; discussions "Mobilisation and Trust" (April 17) and "From the Mobilisation Crisis to National Resilience" (June 2)

June 12, 2026
Cabinet Resolution No. 768: launch of the Transformation of the Defence Forces; July: second edition of the brochure

September 2026
Third survey wave

Sources: project archive of the FDA / InfoLight.UA / Ukrainian Security Club, 2022–2026.

Five waves at a glance

EACH WAVE ANSWERED ITS OWN QUESTION: FROM "WHAT PEOPLE FEAR" IN 2023 TO "WHETHER THEY WILL BELIEVE THE STATE'S PROMISES" IN 2026

Wave	Period	Main result for the model
First wave	November–December 2023	fear, chaos and distrust of the command as the main themes; first proposals on putting mobilisation in order
"Mobilisation: Barriers and Ways to Solutions"	November 2024	risk of death, command, corruption in the TCCs, lack of training; "transfers" only No. 13; the rotation model presented to stakeholders
"Power of Unity"	April 2025	56.4% perceive mobilisation as a dividing line; 69% believe rotation would reduce tension; 45% are ready for partial or rotational service
Second wave	October–December 2025; sub-wave December 2025–January 2026	uncertainty about the length of service is barrier No. 1 (6.21); three steps: pay, a fixed 12-month term, rotations; a package of five reforms
Third wave	from September 7, 2026, fieldwork ongoing	length of service 6.57; 85% do not believe in the November discharge; 82% for extending terms and deferment to everyone who serves



The design of all waves is targeted, not representative: it gives access to groups that are almost absent from classic polls (those who avoid the TCCs, serving soldiers, Ukrainians abroad) and compares the same groups on the same questions

From research to decisions

WHICH OF THE FDA'S PROPOSALS ENTERED THE REFORM, WHAT HAS BEEN DONE IN PART AND WHAT HAS STILL NOT BEEN DONE

IMPLEMENTED

- Fixed terms of service (6/10/14 and 24 months) for those who sign a contract
- Risk-based pay differentiation: from UAH 30,000 in the rear to UAH 460,000 for the infantry, also available to mobilised soldiers
- Guaranteed post-service deferment (the "window of life") from 6 months
- "Serve longer, rest longer": a formula based on combat days and length of service
- Transfers between units via Army+
- Partial discharge of those serving since 2022 announced for late autumn 2026

PARTLY OR IN PROGRESS

- The rotation cycle: r ≈ 0.32 only for combat trajectories, up to 0.62 without combat days
- Digital registration is being introduced; there is no public queue or "discharge calculator"
- Transparent procedures and public performance data
- Demobilisation: the mechanism is not regulated, the decree has not been adopted as of 13 September 2026
- A soft return-from-AWOL mechanism: a one-off window until 20 September 2026, not a permanent instrument

NOT IMPLEMENTED

- Legal form through a law: an experimental resolution until 2028 is in force, draft law No. 14283 was withdrawn
- Parity between mobilised and contract soldiers: guaranteed terms and deferment only for those who signed a contract
- At least 2–3 months of training before the front as the norm
- Separation of coercive functions: police and courts instead of the military; the launch of "Reserve+ offices" not confirmed
- A state architecture for the reform's information policy with KPIs



The 2025 baseline survey accurately predicted the trajectory of the reform: the state officially recognised barrier No. 1, "uncertainty about the length of service", and three of the five reforms in the FDA package partly entered Resolution No. 768

The scope of work in numbers

FIVE SURVEY WAVES, MORE THAN FIVE THOUSAND QUESTIONNAIRES AND FIVE HUNDRED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS AND EXPERT CONVERSATIONS, THREE BROCHURES AND A REFORM PACKAGE, PART OF WHICH THE STATE IS ALREADY IMPLEMENTING

5

SURVEY WAVES

5, 000+

ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRES

with access to groups that are almost absent from classic polls: those who avoid the TCCs, Ukrainians abroad, serving soldiers

500+

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS AND EXPERT CONVERSATIONS

2 billion

VIEWS OF THE INFORMATION ATTACK AROUND THE TCCS

7

PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

3

BROCHURES IN 2026

5 + 7

REFORMS IN THE PACKAGE

4

ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL IN THE REFORM

terms, post-service deferment, pay differentiation and a yearly transfer entered Resolution No. 768; a law, parity, a queue and demobilisation have not yet

Who we are and whom we work with

THREE STRUCTURES OF ONE TEAM, AND THE PARTNERS WHO MADE THIS RESEARCH POSSIBLE

FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

The legal and operational framework of the Ukrainian Security Club and InfoLight.UA, developer of the rotation model of military service; two strategic areas: (1) strategic reforms and democratic governance, (2) security and defence

FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

UKRAINIAN SECURITY CLUB

Founded in 2024 as a networked policy platform; core: Defensive Democracy and the Democracy of National Resilience. Formats: the Situation Room, regional meetings, forums, the "Ukrainian Experts Talks" podcast, training, policy advocacy

USC

INFOLIGHT.UA

Research and analytics group: monitoring of Russian information operations since 2022, the sociology of mobilisation, the Advance Truth Strategy methodology, analytics for the security sector

INFOlight.ua

PARTNERS AND DONORS

- Hanns Seidel Foundation in Ukraine: InfoLight.UA, the Ukrainian Security Club, the Defensive Democracy brochures
- ISAR Ednannia, the Askold and Dir Fund funded by Norway and Sweden: research on the rotation model and the mobilisation reform
- The civil-military movement, veterans' and regional communities of the Ukrainian Security Club

WHO RECEIVES THE RESULTS

- The Ministry of Defence, the General Staff, the Office of the President, the relevant Verkhovna Rada committee
- Media: Ukrinform, Interfax-Ukraine, LB.ua, regional newsrooms
- Partners and donors, international audiences (English-language summaries)

WHAT WE DO NEXT

- Completing the 2026 fieldwork and 20–30 in-depth interviews before and after the discharge decree
- The final bilingual edition of the v2 proposals for the MoD, the General Staff and the Verkhovna Rada committee
- A public dashboard of trust in the reform and a fourth survey wave in 2027

Contact: secureclub.org · press@secureclub.org

VI

DEMOCRACY OF NATIONAL RESILIENCE

FIVE LEVELS OF ONE COMMON CAUSE

THE DEMOCRACY OF NATIONAL RESILIENCE: THE STATE, SOCIETY, THE ARMY, COMMUNITIES, BUSINESS AND THE MEDIA ORGANISED AS A SINGLE COMMON CAUSE OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND DIGNITY

1	RES PUBLICA, THE COMMON CAUSE	The value core. Why should a citizen take part? Because freedom, the state, law and the future are common property, not a service provided by the state. The citizen is a co-owner, not a client
2	DEFENSIVE DEMOCRACY	**The legal component. How does a democracy defend itself without becoming authoritarian? Legal form, proportionality, temporariness, accountability and judicial control of restrictions**
3	COMPREHENSIVE DEFENCE	The organisational framework. With what forces? The army, the reserve, territorial defence, the defence economy, infrastructure, communities, business, the information space
4	NATIONAL RESILIENCE	The functional component. Will the system withstand a blow and recover? Energy, communications, governance, medicine, food, social cohesion
5	CIVIL–MILITARY SOLIDARITY	The stitching mechanism. How it works day to day between the Defence Forces, veterans, communities, business, volunteers, the media and the state

The order of the levels is not accidental: without the value core, comprehensive defence degenerates into militarisation; without the legal component, mobilisation slides into coercion; without the framework and the stitching mechanism, values remain declarations. Defensive Democracy is not the whole model but its legal component.

Source: the brochure "Democracy of National Resilience: the Ukrainian Res Publica in a Long War" (FDA / Ukrainian Security Club / InfoLight.UA, 2026).

A new social contract and the place of the rotation model in it

OPEN-ENDED, UNPREDICTABLE SERVICE IS A FORM OF INTERNAL DOMINATION OF THE STATE OVER THE CITIZEN. ROTATION RESTORES PREDICTABILITY: THE STATE PROVIDES RULES AND A RETURN DATE, THE CITIZEN PROVIDES PARTICIPATION

FAIRNESS

The burden of war is distributed under clear and equal rules: transparent mobilisation, rotation, exemption by function rather than by status, equality before the duty regardless of wealth and connections

PARTICIPATION

"Serve or Contribute": everyone takes part according to their ability: service, the reserve, territorial defence, critical infrastructure, the defence economy, support for soldiers' families. Evading any contribution ceases to be the norm

RETURN

Wartime restrictions and sacrifices are reversible: the state defines not only what it takes but also what it returns and when. For those who served, this is a return date, a job, rehabilitation, the dignity of a veteran

THE ROTATION MODEL AS AN INSTITUTION OF THE COMMON CAUSE

- It works against domination: a citizen's fate depends on rules, not on chance or an official's will
- It works for fair distribution: it does not allow some to be turned into a permanent sacrificial group and others into seekers of exemptions
- It creates armed trust instead of armed cynicism: the state not only demands but also guarantees limits and a return
- Only what the system is able to deliver can be promised: a broken promise of rotation destroys trust faster than its absence

FOUR SAFEGUARDS FOR ANY RESTRICTION

- Legal form: a restriction is introduced by a law that is public and the same for everyone, not by a resolution or "manual control"
- Proportionality: the restriction is targeted, no broader than the specific threat
- Temporariness and reversibility: the measure has a time limit and is wound down once the threat disappears
- Accountability and judicial control: every restriction can be reviewed and challenged; the core of rights is not suspended even in a crisis

VII

NECESSARY STEPS



What the state must do for the first stage to become a system, in what order, and how society will verify it

The logic of the sequence

WITHOUT THE FIRST STEP, THE MODEL FOR CIVILIANS WILL NOT WORK: BOTH THE MILITARY AND REGISTERED CIVILIANS SAY SO. THE ORDER OF THE STEPS MATCHES THE ORDER OF PEOPLE'S DEMANDS

01

AUTUMN 2026: THE DECREE

A presidential decree and the first real discharges of those serving since 2014 and 2022 (announced for late autumn 2026), under public criteria: combat days, length of service, wounds. This is the test that will determine trust in everything else

02

A LAW

A law on terms of service, rotation and demobilisation instead of an experimental resolution: the S and R corridors, a queue, judicial protection, job guarantees, a dual service track

03

A QUEUE

A public queue and a "discharge calculator" in Army+ and Reserve+: everyone sees their date; monthly dashboards: how many discharged, how many contracts, fulfilment of rotation quotas

04

PARITY

Extension of guaranteed terms and deferment to all mobilised soldiers through the queue; only then a call to civilians and model v2 in full

35%

OF THE MILITARY

would believe in the model once it is demonstrated on those already serving; 47% of those serving over 4 years are not signing a contract while they wait for the decree

62%

OF REGISTERED CIVILIANS

"possibly, under certain conditions"; the condition is the same: to see the discharge of those serving since 2022 first

40% · 37% · 23%

WHAT WOULD RAISE TRUST

real discharge, a law, a public queue: the three top answers of 2026 and the first three steps of this sequence

Position on the initiatives of the new MoD and General Staff team

SUPPORT THE CONSENSUS MEASURES, TIE THE CONTESTED ONES TO ROTATION GUARANTEES, REFORMULATE "SERVE OR CONTRIBUTE"

Initiative	Support in 2026	FDA position
Age limit of 50–55, older only in rear roles	72% for	Support as an element of "effectiveness, not numbers", provided it does not replace rotation for younger soldiers
Lowering the mobilisation age to 23	62% for (civilians 52%)	Only as part of a package with rotation guarantees and a law on terms; otherwise young people get open-ended service
Tougher penalties for those evading registration	66% for	Only together with a transparent queue and lawful notification rules: "inevitability without busification"
Police: document checks and search	38% for Reserve+ offices	Support as a separation of functions: the military do not perform police tasks
Foreigners up to half of the infantry through recruiting and PMCs	88% for	Support with a caveat about devaluing citizens' service; requires a separate study
Amnesty for a first AWOL and simplified return	83% for	Make it a permanent mechanism, not a one-off window
Reserve service without leaving one's job	40% for, 34% against	Develop as a component of "Serve or Contribute" and of the rotation corps
Paid exemption through defence contributions	57% against (military 69%)	Reformulate: a contribution does not replace service but complements the duty; exemptions only with justification
Equal obligations for women (registration and call-up)	49% against	Do not include in the second-stage package

2026 data: FDA / InfoLight.UA online survey, fieldwork ongoing.
2026 groups are small: read differences of up to 10 points as a direction, not a precise estimate.

Risks of the second stage and safeguards

SIX RISKS, EACH WITH A MEASURABLE INDICATOR IN THE 2026 DATA, AND SIX SAFEGUARDS

Risk	Indicator in the 2026 data	Safeguard
Failure or imitation of the decree	"no one can change it" 22%, 89% of those serving over 4 years do not believe in the November discharge; the risk of mass AWOL, which respondents write about directly	Public criteria and dates; the first real discharges by the end of 2026; a monthly public dashboard
Loss of momentum through changes of team	the reform became personal: trust fell for 52% after its author resigned; 40% expect no changes from the new team	Institutionalise the reform through a law and a queue so that it does not depend on personalities
Secondary-legislation form	a resolution can be changed as quickly as it was adopted: 66% are against an experiment instead of a law	A law "On Rotational Military Service" before the experiment ends
A two-speed army	guarantees only for contract soldiers: 66% against; the rear trajectory lies outside the model's corridor (r up to 0.62)	Parity through the queue; revision of the deferment formula for non-combat positions
"Evaporation" of the rotation resource	long contracts with bonuses and without the "1 → k" rule will wash volunteers out of the rotation queue	Quotas and the "1 → k" rule for long contracts in non-critical specialties; a threshold condition for deferment
An information vacuum	news media are losing their audience (46% → 19% among civilians), 20% trust no one: the enemy fills the vacuum	The state in the channels people trust; explaining "why", not only "how"; monitoring of influence networks

Data: FDA / InfoLight.UA surveys, 2025 and 2026.

"SERVE OR CONTRIBUTE": THE REFORM WORKS WHEN DEFENCE BECOMES THE CAUSE OF THE WHOLE OF SOCIETY

- Fair rules and terms remain the key to motivation: confirmed by five waves of research in 2023–2026
- Trust is the main currency of the second stage: not advertising, but proven delivery on promises, starting in autumn 2026
- Demobilisation, a law and parity are the price of trust, without which the first stage will not become a system
- The rotation model is not a personnel reform but an institution of fair burden-sharing in the Democracy of National Resilience

Foundation for Democracy Assistance · Ukrainian Security Club · InfoLight.UA

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